# AT Stuy KF Killjoy AC

## Strategy Sheet

Initial strategy thoughts:

Three layers – T, an ace K, and the aff. T should be fairly short to prevent it from detracting from developing K or case, but still substantial enough that the 1AR needs to spend at least 1 minute 30 on it. The ace K will be harder to answer, but it’s kind of out of left field, so you have to have killer explanations. The stuff on the aff is mainly to protect the other two strategies, but I also found a cool NIB and some turns.

The 2NR goes for whichever layer is undercovered for 4 minutes and spends 2 minutes preempting the other layer the 1AR develops.

I also threw in a bunch of links to random stuff – cap, a trans pik, anger and essentialism DAs.

## CX

### Central concepts

What is a killjoy?

Ought we ***be*** killjoys, or ought we just think the symbol of a killjoy is exciting? Who gets to be a killjoy?

Your advocacy text says, “we advocate … refusing the **requirement** to be happy or complicit…”—does the aff advocacy allow any complicity with oppressive structures?

COPYPASTE THE RESPONSE BELOW:

* If YES, then: “they do not solve, since they allow individuals to remain complicit. Individuals are likely to remain complicit – that’s Ahmed 7 – it’s the easiest way to recover in the face of depleting energy” AND READ THE NIB
* If NO, then: “they are internally contradictory – Ahmed 14 link turns the aff – they force individuals to take up a certain affective response to oppression that allows no rest from the struggle – i.e. no self-care” AND READ THE COLLECTIVIZATION TAKEOUT

What are “structures of deliberation” and how do we decide which are hegemonic and which are minoritarian?

### Ace K links

What is ‘joy’?

What is a willful subject? Who can be willful?

What is affect?

### T

Please identify every card you can extend against theory or topicality arguments in the 1AR.

### Killing the Joy of Others/SCUM

Who decides what white joy is and when it’s dead?

# 1NC – T

#### [T shell omitted].

#### Topical version of the aff solves all your offense—You can read an aff reclaiming feminists’ free speech as speaking truth to power in the academy to contest its interpretation as a nag. You can read a neg killjoy position arguing that “free speech” is deployed to silence students along racial and gendered lines. Ahmed writes a bunch about how issues of free speech, the construction of “censoring students,” safe spaces, and critique interact on US college campuses. Here’s one card:

Ahmed 15 [Ahmed, Sara. “Against Students.” *The New Inquiry*. 29 June 2015. [www.thenewinquiry.com/essays/against-students/](http://www.thenewinquiry.com/essays/against-students/) // WWXR]

Yet the instances of apparent censorship (translate: student protests) seem to generate *more* discourse and discussion rather than preventing discourse or discussion. So much high-profile speech and writing is generated by those who claim they are silenced!

But we can still ask: what is the figure of the censoring student doing? By hearing student critique as censorship, the content of that critique is pushed aside. When you hear a challenge as an attempt at censorship you do not have to engage with the challenge. You do not even have to say anything of substance because you assume the challenge is without substance.

In the first instance, critique and contestation (“they want the wrong courses!”) is dismissed as consumerism; in the second instance, protest (“they don’t want the right people!”) is dismissed as censorship.

Sweep, sweep.

Beep, beep.

Error message.

Another figure comes up, rather quickly, at this point, often lurking behind the censoring student. This is the over-sensitive student: the one who responds to events or potential events with hurt feelings. She also comes up as someone who stops things from happening. I could refer here to a number of recent pieces that I read as *a moral panic about moral panics*. Many of these pieces refer to US college campuses specifically and are concerned with the introduction of safe spaces and trigger warnings.

The figure of the over-sensitive student is invested with power. The story goes: because students have become too sensitive, we cannot even talk about difficult issues in the classroom; because of their feelings we (critical academics) cannot address questions of power and violence, and so on. A typical example of this kind of rhetoric: “No one can rebut feelings, and so the only thing left to do is shut down the things that cause distress – no argument, no discussion, just hit the mute button and pretend eliminating discomfort is the same as effecting actual change.” Or another: “While keeping college-level discussions ‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, it’s bad for them and for everyone else. People ought to go to college to sharpen their wits and broaden their field of vision.” Here safety is about feeling good, or not feeling bad. We sense what is being feared; students will become warm with dull edges, not sharp enough in wit or wisdom.

[continues]

My own sense is that our feminist political hopes rest with over-sensitive students.

Over-sensitive can be translated as: Sensitive to that which is not over.

All of these ways of making students into the problem work to create a picture of professors or academics as the ones who are “really” oppressed by students. This is what it means to articulate a position or a view “against students.” One US professor speaks of being “frightened” by his liberal students. He blames so much on “identity politics.” And so much is blamed on identity politics; that term is used whenever we challenge how spaces are occupied. It has become another easy dismissal. We are learning more here about professors (their investments, emotions, and strategies of dismissal) than we are learning about students.

# 1NC – Ace K

#### Questioning problematics of desire enacts a focus on desire and erases asexuality. To counteract the friction of institutional closure, the AC proposes willfulness and affective analysis. But their analysis misses how not-desiring is dangerous for asexual individuals and their willfulness is inaccessible to ace folks.

Hanson 2 [Hanson, Elizabeth Hanna, “Toward an Asexual Narrative Structure.” *Asexualities: Feminist and Queer Perspectives*. Ed.s Karli June Cerankowski and Megan Milks. New York: Routledge (2014). // WWXR]

Instead, asexuality faces conceptual resistance from the “sexual assumption,” which Mark Carrigan defines as “the usually unexamined presupposition that sexual attraction is both universal … and uniform … such that its absence must be explicable in terms of a distinguishable pathology.”5 In Carrigan’s analysis, the sexual assumption owes its ideological tenacity in large part to its long history of uncontested experiential plausibility. Only with the emergence of asexual identity has its explanatory dominance been challenged, and this challenge continues to meet with considerable resistance. While asexuality may, by some accounts, qualify as queer by existing beyond the pale of heteronormativity, it is subject[s asexuality] to erasure even in queer space by the sexual assumption. Heteronormativity always masks the root cause of asexual erasure: a more deeply rooted, more widespread erotonormativity, which positions and privileges the experience of sexual attraction as normative and is expressed most emblematically in the sexual assumption. Erotonormativity is always already present in heteronormativity; compulsory sexuality is embedded in compulsory heterosexuality. However, “erotonormativity” speaks to the fact that much more than sex underlies asexual erasure, for asexuality threatens more than just the sexual assumption. Importantly, “erotonormativity” captures the teleological aspect of Freudian Eros, which describes not only sexual energy but that more general energy engaged in constructive activity tending toward unity and synthesis: the kind of energy we see at work in narrative sense-making, for instance.6 It must be understood that this is not a chapter about asexuals in narrative. In an effort to steer clear of the evidentiary problems and the dangers of anachronism that reading for 662 asexual identity would present, I consider instead the implications of the logic of asexuality for narrative structure, taking Henry James’ “The Beast in the Jungle” (1903) and The Sacred Fount (1901) as my examples. Asexuality’s effects on narrative are much farther-reaching than the narrow subset of stories about asexuals and the occasional appearance of arguably asexual characters in fiction might suggest. My location of asexuality in narrative stasis in this chapter, importantly, is not merely an analogical flight of fancy, for seeking asexuality in narrative puts pressure on desire. Desire is a question of aim, movement, teleology, and causality, and these underlie the conditions of modern subjectivity and knowledge, themselves conditions of that quintessentially modern genre, the novel.

#### The alternative is to embrace the possibility of asexuality. Ace people are positioned as unintelligibly other to humanity, but their becoming possible is necessary to resolving this opposition. Frames matter and shape the lives we engage with so questioning the aff’s representations comes first.

Chasin 15 [Chasin, CJ Deluzio (Department of Psychology, University of Windsor). “Making Sense in and of the Asexual Community: Navigating Relationships and Identities in a Context of Resistance.” *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 25: 167–180 (2015). Published online 1 July 2014 in Wiley Online Library. Accessed 5 February 2015. DOI: 10.1002/casp.2203 // WWXR]

Changing the shape of (asexual) social reality Asexuality as a possible social identity is a relatively recent phenomenon, and the powerful, prolific asexual discourses even more so. The words that people use to talk about relationships and identities can change the discursive landscape of those relationships and identities, altering what they mean and therefore what they are all about (Bradac, 1983). In generating new discourses of relationships and identity, people self-identifying as asexual are making it possible to make sense as asexual people—making asexual people ‘make sense’. These new asexual/ace discourses are making being asexual/ace possible in a very real sense, in ways that were not possible a short time ago and which extend beyond the ability to merely independently describe oneself as asexual/ace. To be unintelligible (i.e. beyond the realm of possibility) is to be positioned as an outsider to humanity, against which human subjects are formed (Butler, 1990). This unintelligibility underlies much of the anti-asexual hostility described above. In generating asexual/ace discourses, the asexual/ace community is making it possible for asexual people to be possible and to live the possibility of asexual lives. Butler (1990, p. 219), proclaimed, ‘For those who are still looking to become possible, possibility is a necessity’. Although she was referring specifically to gender, the sentiment applies more broadly. It is through prolific discussions and emerging asexual discourses that asexual people are making themselves possible, by constructing their relationships and identities. Lesbians and gay men (and to a lesser extent, bisexual people) have already gone through the cultural process of self-creation (e.g. Brown, 1989). Asexual people are just beginning it. Psychologists engaging with (a)sexually diverse populations can help this process by familiarising themselves with asexuality and asexual/ace discourses, and by taking asexual people’s accounts of their own experiences seriously.

# 1NC – Case

## T > ROTB

### AT Fine 13

#### Fine is a reason to prefer topicality:

#### 1. The models of debate Fine endorses, like Qatar Debate, have strict topicality rules.

Qatar Debate website: “A debate is a form of public discourse; it is a formal direct oral contest or competition in argumentation between two or more people on a **defined proposition** at a specific time.” - See more at: http://www.qatardebate.org/debate-and-debating/what-is-debate#sthash.IhW8dfiY.dpuf

#### 2. TURN—Fine doesn’t endorse making debate all about providing resistance strategies, but rather argues for reforms to debate—e.g. expanding urban debate leagues, balancing spreading with community engagement—to make debate more empowering. This is consistent with centering debate on one topic—all the pragmatic benefits to T are a reason the ROTB collapses.

#### 3. TURN—addressing nontopical resistance strategies in round exacerbates the “ongoing ideological war in…debate rounds themselves” which Fine impacts as sowing pessimism and pain in debaters themselves.

DO NOT READ 4 IF YOU ARE SAYING POLICYMAKING GOOD

#### 4. Card is in the context of Policy debate. While LD is flawed, it is more organic and more inclusive of discussions of violence than Policy—solves the ROTB—but a necessary constraint is centering argument on proving the rez true.

Colling 12 Richard Colling, “THE TRUTH-TESTING PARADIGM AS A STRAW MAN” BY RICHARD COLLING THE FORENSICS FILES’S THE NATIONAL JOURNAL OF SPEECH & DEBATE VOLUME I: ISSUE 1 OCTOBER 2012

Debaters shape the event rather than having a particular approach imposed upon them, and this makes LD inherently more organic. Novice LD debaters are taught a basic framework and then they are able to play with it to find their style, method, and arguments. This empowers them to blossom as speakers and as thinkers. In CX, the agent of action is always the United States federal government, but it need not be that way in LD. In CX, the assumed standard is utilitarianism. In LD, we can discuss and debate alternative theories of the good. In CX the object of evaluation is always a policy and its implications. In LD, we can consider and advocate for non-policy methods of proving something true. All of this affords LD debaters more consideration of issues in ways unique to our activity. It is imprudent to attempt to turn LD into a poor man’s policy debate. The speaking times alone would undermine such a goal.

### AT Ahmed 07

I am not sure we need to answer this—it just justifies norms creation.

And, spaces like debate are oriented around the repetition of bodies that inhabit them – a chair become molded around a body that constantly sit in it – when I sink into the chair, if I fit into the mold I no longer notice the points of tension between my body and the chair. Bodies sink into chairs in the same way bodies sink into institutions – whiteness cohere spaces in certain shapes so that bodies that fit in them no longer notice friction while those that don’t experience stoppage and tension – this is why debate tournaments are full of white guys in suits, because when people of color or women enter the cafeteria they are seen as out of place.

Ahmed 07 Sara Ahmed "A Phenomenology of Whiteness" Goldsmiths College, University of London 2007 www.rainbow-season.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Feminist\_Theory-2007-Ahmed-149-68.pdf
But how does … some and not others.

#### Just justifies norms mattering and that white guys don’t take account of their privilege. It’s only impacted out by the Fraser 90 card, so reject new extrapolations.

### AT Fraser 90

This creates friction – bodies are stopped and interrogated when they do not fit in the orientation of the space. Feminine speech in spaces of white supremacy becomes the incessant nag. This inequality makes debate impossible – unconscious and informal mechanisms of exclusion mean that participants aren’t on an even playing field.  Even when minoritarian subjects do speak, they are not heard – addressing this social inequality is a prerequisite for further deliberation.

Fraser 90 Fraser 90 \*Edited for ableist rhetoric Nancy, Prof of Political and Social Science at the New School, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” Social Text 25/26, p.63-65
Habermas's account of … discursive interaction within them.

#### [omitted]

### AT Ahmed 13

AND, this creates uneven energy distributions. Institutions deplete the energy of those it wants to exclude – the energy to get up, to keep fighting, to keep existing in spaces.

Ahmed 13 Sara Ahmed "Feeling Depleted" November 17, 2013 Feminist Kill-Joy <https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/11/17/feeling-depleted/>
I am currently … depleted with others.

This is a form of psychological violence – alienation and isolation within debate deplete the energy of minoritized bodies who are held up as symbols of diversity when they do well and experience microaggressions when they don’t. The burden is constantly on those bodies to make the debate space more accessible.

#### 1. Self-refuting—refusing complicity is energy-depleting and allowing complicity is alienating. Aff can’t solve.

#### 2. Assumes a primary accessibility that inheres in an ideal version of debate. That doesn’t exist—competing interps proves debate norms are non-ideal and generated via a race to the top.

#### 3. Justifies stopping microaggressions and avoiding vapid diversity discussions, but those are problems with how debaters act, not with the rules of the game.

## Ace

### OV

#### [omitted]

### RC

#### The figure of the asexual can also disrupt our understanding of happiness through questioning the necessity of sex. Sex is read as essential to personal fulfillment—successful debaters are regarded as sexually desirable, double standards exist for sexual behavior at tournaments and camps, and sexual harassment is a primary mode of control per the examples in the AC—asexuality is uniquely key to challenging the root manifestation of regulatory happiness.

Kurowicka 14 [Kurowicka, Anna (Polish Academy of Sciences). “What can Asexuality Do for Queer Theories?” *LES Online*, Vol. 6, No 1 (2014). pp. 3-4 // WWXR 2016-5-29]

According to Ahmed, happiness has become a duty rather than a privilege and failing in this duty is often seen as a proof of one’s shortcomings, in accordance with the liberal discourse of individual responsibility and agency. Most importantly for queer theories, the understanding of happiness tends to be restrictive and limited and consequently places certain subjects on the outside of the happy society: feminists, queers, migrants, and many other misfits. In her chapter on “Happy Futures” Ahmed proposes a figure of a revolutionary “who refuses happiness, which means not only failing to be happy, but not wanting to be happy” and instead embraces “the freedom to live a life that deviates from the paths of happiness” (2010, p. 192, 195). This might be understood in two different ways: either as a call to redefine what happiness means (which is the path taken by the asexual community when they questions the necessity of sex), or in its stronger meaning, as a rejection of happiness as an important value. Ahmed also points to the political possibilities of choosing to experience unhappiness: “we would radicalize freedom as the freedom to be unhappy” (2012, p. 195). In her view, unhappiness is a potentially radical political choice, often made by the marginalized subjects, who may be forcibly excluded from the dominant discourse of happiness or decide to reject it themselves. While she does not explicitly mention asexuals, it seems that her chapter on “unhappy queers” fits the situation of asexuals just as well as lesbians, gays, and trans\* persons, as the popular association of a healthy sex life with fulfillment and happiness excludes asexuals from the narrative. Similarly to Edelman’s anti-futurity, this stigma can be reinterpreted as creating a potentially productive figure of an unhappy asexual whose rejection of the seemingly unquestionable value of happiness highlights problems inherent in the duty to be happy. This attempt to undermine indisputable positivist values is also present in Tomasz Sikora’s project of thinking a “strategic negativism” that allows one to occupy a marginal position that is epistemologically privileged in terms of questioning social and political realities. While Sikora uses the notion of a strategic outside to discuss the violence of inclusion into the liberal society and possible ethics of (queer) betrayal, it also has a potential for theorizing the unique position of an asexual. According to him, “The outside [...] is to be understood as negating, or at least suspending, the present social positivities, and thus as a form of 'strategic negativism' that counters the usurpations of the liberal capitalist utopia and its models of political agency. [...] The negativity of the outside is not a pure place from which to launch a total attack on the inside, but a constant problematization, [through various practices, of the mechanisms of interiorization and immunization.]” (2013) This notion of suspending social positivities follows the anti-social strands of queer theories, such as the idea of non-futurity, whose importance for theorizing asexuality was already discussed. The possibility of thinking an outside is, of course, highly problematic, and (at least for now) it is bound to be more of a theoretical possibility than an actual position that would endow the “thinker” with any sort of distanced and thus more critical perspective. What is crucial is the idea of imagining such a position in order to problematize certain practices of inclusion and exclusion of minorities, as well as assumptions about universal values, such as the above mentioned happiness and reproduction. As a result, the figure of an asexual can be perceived as a new embodiment of Ahmed’s “unhappy queer” and Edelman’s “non-reproducing queer,” one that is perhaps even more radically opposed to the aforementioned values by standing against any sex, not only the supposedly reproductive and happiness-inducing heterosexual sex. The asexual perspective is uniquely suited for this outside position, as it can be thought of as occupying a place outside of the norm of sexuality (Przybylo, 2011). Naturally, this is a purely theoretical proposition, since asexuals are also socialized in a sexual world, so their position of outsiders is in no way a clear-cut opposition to the sexualized world, but rather a constant negotiating of the social reality and their own affects and experiences. Nevertheless, asexuality provides yet another critical approach to the dominant sexual norms: just like gays and lesbians by their very existence stand for a negation of heteronormativity, bisexuals – of the binarism of homo/hetero division, and queers of stable and cohesive sexual identities, asexuals negate the very norm of being sexual.

### K solves case

#### Asexuality is vital to disrupting the reproductive imperatives that ensure patriarchal institutions’ propagation—the K solves case.

Pryzybylo and Cooper 14 [Pryzybylo, Ela, and Danielle Cooper. “Asexual Resonances: Tracing a Queerly Asexual Archive.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 20, Number 3, 2014, pp. 297-318 (Article) // WWXR]

Solanas, a radical anti-establishment figure and author of the inventive and “disruptively nonassimilable” “SCUM (Society for Cutting Up Men) Manifesto,” also deployed asexuality as a political critique of state and patriarchy. Unlike Densmore, with her hopeful feminist optimism and belief that celibacy can amount to women’s liberation, Solanas was critical of the women’s liberation movement and projected a killjoy spirit of nihilism that consisted of women’s complete system overthrow made possible by asexuality.52 First, Solanas, like Densmore, provided a critique of the cultural centrality of sex, describing it as excessive, “a solitary experience, noncreative, a gross waste of time” as well as “animalistic” and “the refuge of the mindless.”53 Next, asexuality is proposed as a vital tool to be used by SCUM women—the “self-con dent, swinging, thrill-seeking females”—for overthrowing patriarchy and creating “a female society [ . . . of] funky females grooving on each other.”54 For Solanas, political asexuality serves the role of end[s]ing systems of inequality and patriarchy through curtailing the reproduction of men, and in a final nihilistic turn, completely terminating spe- cies reproduction: “Why produce even females? Why should there be future gen- erations? What is their purpose?” she asks.55 Solanas proposes asexuality in the context of the late 1960s to critique the permissive sexual turn and the women’s liberation movement, and as a theoretically rigorous tool for thinking different world systems.

## Killjoy

### AT Ahmed 10 (2)

Thus, we advocate the methodology of the feminist killjoy – refusing the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression. Our affective analysis contests hegemonic structures of deliberation that marginalize the oppressed and kill the joy of white comfortability.

Ahmed 10 Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010
Killjoys To be unseated … we will and we are.

A killjoy kills the joy of sexist and racist institutions and refuses the modes of happiness that are forced upon them – calling out sexism at debate tournaments kills the joy of the white male debaters; the Zapatista movement congregated around a Brown Metisza identity and used that to kill the joy of white supremacy; it is an internal rejection of the paradigm of complicity in happiness – reclaiming the idea that women or people of color constantly need to be happy in systems of oppression.

#### TURN: They say “a killjoy kills the joy of…the white male debaters…” but that stance reinscribes happiness as a value you’re depriving oppressors of. No point to making white male debaters feel sad if happiness isn’t valuable. Don’t use happiness as a tool, period.

#### That outweighs—the aff badly misreads happiness—it’s not just an emotional state that inheres in certain bodies. Happiness shapes interactions—it most likely further marginalizes the aff rather than creating collectives.

Ahmed 10 [Ahmed, Sara. *The Promise of Happiness*. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, print. // WWXR]

We learn from this history how happiness is used as a technology or instru­ ment, which allows the reorientation of individual desire toward a common good. We also learn from rereading books like Emile how happiness is not simply used to secure social relations instrumentally but works as an idea or aspiration within everyday life, shap[es]ing the very terms through which individuals share their world with others, creating “scripts” for howto live well. We can think of gendered scripts as “happiness scripts” providing a set of instructions for what women and men must do in order to be happy, whereby happiness is what follows being natural or good. Going along with happiness scripts is how we get along: to get along is to be willing and able to express happiness in proximity to the right things. The child thus has a happiness duty. A duty can function as a debt, a way of returning what is owed. In the previous chapter, I spoke of happiness as involving the logic of deferral: the parents defer their hope for happiness to the next generation in order to avoid giving up on the idea of happiness as a response to disappointment (you can keep your belief in happiness while being disappointed as long as you can place your hopes for happiness in another). The obligation of the child to be happy is a repaying of what the child owes, of what is due to the parents given what they have given up. The duty of the child is to make the parents happy and to perform this duty happily by being happy or by showing signs of being happy in the right way. Going along with this duty can mean simply approximating the signs of being happy—passing as happy—in order to keep things in the right place. Feminist genealogies can be described as genealogies of women who not only do not place their hopes for happiness in the right things but who speak out about their unhappiness with the very obligation to be made happy by such things. The history of feminism is thus a history of making trouble, a history of women who refuse to become Sophy, by refusing to follow other people’s goods, or by refusing to make others happy. The female troublemaker might be trouble because she gets in the way of the happiness of others. Judith Butler shows how the figure of the trouble-maker exposes the intimacy of rebellion and punishment within the law. As she argues in her preface to Gender Trouble. “To make trouble was, within the reigning discourse of my childhood, something one should never do precisely because that would get one in trouble. The rebellion and its reprimand seemed to be caught up in the same terms, a phenomenon that gave rise to my first critical insight into the subtle ruse of power: The prevailing law threatened one with trouble, even put one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble” (1950: vii). Happiness might be what keeps you out of trouble only by evoking the unhappiness of getting into trouble. We can consider how nineteenth century bildungsroman novels by women writers offered a rebellion against Emile in the narrativization of the limitations of moral education for girls and its narrow precepts of happiness. Such novels are all about the intimacy of trouble and happiness.

### AT Ahmed 14 (Collectivization)

Net Benefit is Collectivization – our method is an act of self love that opens up spaces of solidarity and connects minoritized bodies together. Our methodology supports bottom up movements that refuse humanizing politics. These spaces of solidarity can resolve psychological violence because we refuse the internal demands to be happy in spaces that oppress us

Ahmed 14 Sara Ahmed "Selfcare as Warfare" feministkilljoys https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/ August 25 2014

“Caring for myself … for your survival. Always.

#### 1. No link between refusing the requirement to be happy or calling out others, and caring about one’s self. They would need to explain why calling out others or embracing sadness leads to “directing our care towards ourselves.” But that’s impossible because Ahmed says self-care is the METHOD of redirecting care away from sustaining oppressive institutions, not a CONSEQUENCE of the method of the killjoy. No new warrants. They don’t access collectivization—making white males uncomfortable doesn’t result in solidarity for minorities. Self-care ENABLES becoming a killjoy, not the other way around, so the aff cannot solve.

#### 2. TURN: Killing joy doesn’t resolve psychological violence—reactions to killjoys worsen the original violence. Outweighs on probability—your evidence concedes killjoys usually receive hateful responses.

#### 3. The aff is a double-turn—trying to control others’ feelings by being a killjoy trades off with self-care. More likely true since Ahmed’s citation of Audre Lorde in the un-underlined text says “caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle” such as kinds that involve bodily vulnerability, e.g. calling men out.

# 2NR – T

#### [omitted – these were answers to her responses on T, but I didn’t write many of them so I didn’t feel comfortable including them]

# 2NR – Ace K

I omitted much of the 2NR stuff since in every round most was (a) extemped and (b) personal. But I’ve left the headers so you can see how I organized blocks.

## Overview

## Extension

### Erasure Link

### Desire Focus Link

### Tradeoff Link

## AT Perms

### MX

#### Asexuality is mutually exclusive—it’s irreducible to feminist struggle. Killing joy or happiness presupposes the coherence of those categories to articulate certain bodies’ experiences—aceness denies that assumption because it delinks sexed and gendered happiness from pleasure.

### Aff-specific

#### 1. Centering DA—the perm enacts yet another sidelining of asexuality to the margins of the women’s liberation movement. If we don’t care about asexuality now, then when will we care?

Pryzybylo and Cooper 14 [Pryzybylo, Ela, and Danielle Cooper. “Asexual Resonances: Tracing a Queerly Asexual Archive.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 20, Number 3, 2014, pp. 297-318 (Article) // WWXR]

Crucially, theoretical moments of asexuality are not center stage in the writings of Densmore and Solanas, and they are certainly not abundant in the writings of the women’s liberation movement, let alone in feminist and queer debates on sexuality since then.43 Fahs, in “Radical Refusals: On the Anarchist Politics of Women Choosing Asexuality,” comments that asexuality tends to be left out of the “master narrative of the sexual revolution” and lost in feminist debates.44 In this sense, moments of asexuality, political or otherwise, might be understood as a sort of “shadow feminism,” “long haunt[ing] the more acceptable forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than negativity, rejection, transformation.”45 As an “alternative feminist project,” and perhaps even “an antisocial feminism,” asexuality and celibacy have both fallen through the cracks of feminist and queer theorizing.46

#### Outweighs:

#### A. Accounts for the history of the movement your symbol was drawn from.

#### B. Uniqueness—nobody else is talking about asexuality; Ahmed has more influence, wiki proves a net benefit to centering aceness in this debate.

#### 2. Aceness is positioned as *inhuman* and *outside* of the frictional shaping of bodies the aff challenges—the Chasin evidence is fire on how aceness is *not yet possible*, which means that the perm has no risk of solving the K. If one does not have a body at all, the molding of a chair is immaterial.

#### 3. The perm’s recuperation of aceness deprives it revolutionary potential—the idea that ace people can be understood as another modality of desire embraces a logic of incorporation—that papers over difference which locks in violence.

#### 4. The perm is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive, killing solvency. They can’t draw principled distinctions between ace struggles and femme struggles and black struggles, for instance—the equivocation of “white” and “male” in the plantext and throughout the AC proves. That’s bad—the perm can’t disinclude enough to focus on specific, concrete action, killing solvency. And it can’t include enough to be motivating to diverse people’s irreducibly unique experiences.

### Disability DA

### AT Perm Double-bind

### AT You’re privileged/performative

# Extra

## Kritikal NIB

#### The aff attempts a redistribution of affect through the affirmation of a symbol. For its project to succeed, therefore, it needs to meet two necessary thresholds: achieving revolutionary consciousness and estranging from the present.

Their author, Ahmed 10 [Ahmed, Sara. *The Promise of Happiness*. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, print. // WWXR]

I agree: happiness is interesting. The more I follow the word happiness around, the more it captures my interest. We can still recognize the significance of queer pessimism as an alien affect: a queer politics which refuses to organize its hope for happiness around the figure of the child or other tropes for reproductivity and survival is already alienated from the present. Queer pessimism matters as a pessimism about a certain kind of optimism, as a refusal to be optimistic about “the right things" in the right kind of way. Certain forms of political negativity are read as stubbornness or as a way of being stuck. We learned about this dynamic from the figure of the melancholic migrant who is read as holding on to something that has already gone in the very act of noticing racism as going on and ongoing. Indeed the very act of recognizing injustice in the present is read as a theft of optimism, a killing of joy, a failure to move on or to put certain histories behind us. Queer pessimism becomes interesting as an alien affect, although to become pessimistic as a matter of principle is to risk being optimistic about pessimism its elf. Snediker is right to point out that queer affirmations of negativity are not simply negative. To embrace the negative or to say yes to a no cannot be described as a purely negative gesture. To affirm negation is still an affirmation, which could reinstitute a certain yes as the proper signifier of queer politics, even as a yes to what’s not (see Ahmed 2006: 175). I am tempted to call this move “being for being against,” My response to the affirmation of negation would not be to affirm or negate affirmation in return but to ask for a differ­ ent orientation to what is being or not being affirmed. Rather than affirming positive or negative affects, my task throughout this book has been to read how positive and negative affects are distributed and how this distribution is pedagogic—we learn about affect by reading about the how of its distribution. In this chapter, I want to think about the redistribution of affect that is possible in the achievement of what we can call “revolutionary consciousnesses” and how this redistribution takes time and animates our relationship to time. Forms of political consciousness must be achieved, as Gyorgy Lukacs taught us in History and Class Consciousness (1971). It is important not to individuate such an achievement but to recognize the role of collective labor in the process of becoming conscious of class, race, and gendered forms of oppression, which involves a necessary estrangement from the present.

#### They don’t meet consciousness—that requires a) the intentional creation of a new collective will more specified than a symbol and not left up to organic, bottom-up movement and b) discipline, which they definitely do not meet since in CX they say individuals can choose to not be unhappy.

Lukacs, the author Ahmed cites, 23 [Lukacs, Georg, *History and Class Consciousness*, 1923, [https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/ch08.htm //](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/ch08.htm%20//) WWXR]

The conscious desire for the realm of freedom can only mean consciously taking the steps that will really lead to it. And in the awareness that in contemporary bourgeois society individual freedom can only be corrupt and corrupting because it is a case of unilateral privilege based on the unfreedom of others, this desire must entail the renunciation of individual freedom. It implies the conscious subordination of the self to that collective will that is destined to bring real freedom into being and that today is earnestly taking the first arduous, uncertain and groping steps towards it. This conscious collective will is the Communist Party. And like every aspect of a dialectical process it too contains the seeds, admittedly in a primitive, abstract and undeveloped form, of the determinants appropriate to the goal it is destined to achieve: namely freedom in solidarity. The unifying factor here is discipline. Only through discipline can the party be capable of putting the collective will into practice, whereas the introduction of the bourgeois concept of freedom prevents this collective will from forming itself and so transforms the party into a loose aggregate of individuals incapable of action. More importantly, even for the individual it is only discipline that creates the opportunity of taking that first step to the freedom that is already possible even though it is freedom, of a very primitive sort, corresponding as it does to the stage of societal development. This is the freedom that works at overcoming the present. Every Communist Party represents a higher type of organisation than every bourgeois party or opportunist workers’ party, and this shows itself in the greater demands made by the party on its individual members. This emerged very clearly as early as the first split in Russian Social Democracy. Whereas for the Mensheviks (as for every fundamentally bourgeois party) the simple acceptance of the Party Programme was an adequate qualification for membership, for the Bolsheviks, party membership was synonymous with active personal participation in the work of revolution. This principle underlying party structure did not alter in the course of the revolution. The theses of the Third Congress that deal with organisation state: “To accept a communist programme is to announce one’s intention of becoming a Communist ... the first prerequisite for the serious implementation of the programme is that all members should be involved in constant, day-to-day collaboration.” Of course, in many cases this principle exists only on paper even to this day. But this does not in the least detract from its fundamental importance. For just as the realm of freedom cannot be given to us as a present all at once, as a gratia irresistitibilis, just as the ‘final goal’ is not simply waiting for us somewhere outside the process but inheres in every particular aspect of the process, so too the Communist Party as the revolutionary form of consciousness of the proletariat is a process by nature. Rosa Luxemburg saw very clearly that “the organisation must come into being as the product of struggle”. Her mistake was merely to overestimate the organic nature of the process while underestimating the importance of conscious organisation.

#### They don’t meet estrangement—that a) requires a firm rejection of making others uncomfortable and b) fails if it begins from the phenomenological standpoint of marginalized subjects—your Ahmed 7 card definitely bites.

Adorno 51 [Adorno, Theodor W. *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*. Trans. E. F. N. Jephcott. London: Verso, 2005. First published 1951. Print. pp. 38–39 // WWXR 2016-8-4]

Finale - The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects - this alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror- image of its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hait's breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is, ifit shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to the worldI' Even its ownimpossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.

## Solvency Takeouts

### Collectivization Takeout

#### Attempts to create a collectivity through killjoy complaints fail—they exclude women who imperfectly embody the killjoy, e.g. by enjoying their own family life.

Berlant 88 [Berlant, Lauren (UChicago). “The Female Complaint.” *Social Text*, No. 19/20. (Autumn, 1988), pp. 237-259. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0164-2472%28198823%290%3A19%2F20%3C237%3ATFC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F> // WWXR]

This politics of identification, in which the public testimonv and witnessing of female struggle plays a central theatrical and political role, is founded on a paradox in the social construction of female marginality. Unlike other victims of generic social discrimination, women are expected to live with and to desire the parties who have traditionally and institutionally denied them legitimacy and autonomy. These contradictory tendencies of social organization impede for women the production of the kind of group consciousness generated by, for example, the physical ghettoization of many ethnic, racial, and religious communities. Thus the "complaint," which I will discuss as a paradigm of public female discourse, is shot through with anxieties about audience that in part derive from the absence of a theatrical space in which women might see, experience, live, and rebel against their oppression en masse, freed from the oppressors' forbidding or disapproving gaze. Feminism aims to create such a vital space of communal political consciousness-a female-centered public sphere.5 Along with this almost physical fragmentation of women is the colonizing effect patriarchal fantasies of women have on female self-consciousness: woman's very entrapment within a reductive and genericizing patriarchal fantasy-vulgarly put, that "all women are alike"-becomes the distinguishing mark of gender for women. The symbolic and political content of patriarchal fantasy is culturally and historically particular: what is universally powerful about its mode of domination is that it creates the situation it imagines. The fantasv that all women are, more or less, alike produces a meta-symbolic order in which the female sex is defined as that element which needs to be explicated or contextualized in one or another patriarchal narrative. Indeed, feminism's crucial fusing of the personal and the political comes from turning women's individual gyno-genealogical scars into diacritical marks in different kinds of oppositional narrative and social practices. Thus it is not surprising that in the moment of public display, feminists deploying their gender as if alone in a private, protected, intimate space, became shocked and horrified by their mutual alienation: at the very moment when feminism was supposed to operate its own relatively autonomous public sphere, a place where female speech takes place without fear of erasure or humiliation, the movement reveals its power to exclude, to be yet one more index of female failure. This rupture of identification must open the question of whether feminism has, in fact, have "a" potential constituency in "all women."

#### Berlant cites the example of activist Erica Jong, who faced hostility for her poetry celebrating pregnancy and recuperating its significance for feminism. The killjoy spirit punches down into feminist movements, fragmenting rather than uniting. This outweighs on probability—it’s intrinsic to a focus on happiness.

2NR:

#### Extend Berlant 88. The aff can’t create collectivity since symbolically oppositional figures like the killjoy are too contested. Instead of centering concretes such as the literal segregation of cities by race, or in debate lack of participation along gendered and raced axes, they focus on killing happiness. That’s too subjective—alienation and fragmentation is the inevitable result—extend the probability weighing. Means the aff can never solve.

### Encircling Takeout

#### The aff is neither radical nor new—killjoys have already been incorporated into a patriarchal economy of complaint as mediative figures AND killjoys can’t escape the circumscription of female discourse as complaint. They can’t solve.

Berlant 88 [Berlant, Lauren (UChicago). “The Female Complaint.” *Social Text*, No. 19/20. (Autumn, 1988), pp. 237-259. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0164-2472%28198823%290%3A19%2F20%3C237%3ATFC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F> // WWXR]

The female complaint serves in particular to mediate and manage the social contradictions that arise from women's sexual and affective allegiance to a phallocentric ideology that has, in practice, denied women power, privilege, and presence in the public and private spheres. To the extent that women employ the complaint as a mode of self-expression, it is an admission and a recognition both of privilege and pourerlessness: it is a powerful record of patriarchal oppression, circumscribed by a knowledge of woman's inevitable delegitimation within the patriarchal public sphere.22 The a priori marking of female discourse as less serious is paradoxically the only condition under which the complaint mode can operate as an effective political tool: the female complaint allows the woman who wants to maintain her alignment with men to speak oppositionallv but without fear for her position within the heterosexual economy-because ;he mode of her discourse concedes the intractability of the (phallocentric) conditions of the complaint's production. For it is not the woman who first calls her self-articulation a complaint, a whine, a plea: rather, the patriarchal social context in which she makes her utterance hystericizes it for her, even before she speaks. As a euphemism for menstruation, "the female complaint" typifies the banality of female suffering: every month we (that is, all of us, those who can think of the woman as Other) hear woman's litany of the ills done to her, but we can't be moved by it, because she brought it on herself, she's weak, that's just the way she is.23 The female complaint is thus an aesthetic "witnessing" of injury. Situated precisely in the space between a sexual politics that threatens structures of patriarchal authority and a sentimentality that confirms the inevitabilitv of the speaker's powerlessness, the female complaint registers the speaker's frustration, rage, abjection, and heroic self-sacrifice, in an oppositional utterance that declares its limits in its very saying. Roxanne's Revenge is to witness, to testify. But because she articulates her position within the dialectic of desire that produces her rage, her resistance is also easily absorbed into that economy, and easily transformed into a kind of nonsense, chatter, hysterical or seductive patter. Public female protest discourse is always in danger of ending up like this, written as it is in a context in which it is always vulnerable to be so named: a nag, a whine, a complaint. Women's inability to sustain a right or left wing female discourse that fully resists and refunctions the negations of the public sphere stems from the historical antinomy between women and public authority. One instance of this phenomenon, the age-old controversy over the value of women's popular discourses, might be traced through American cultural history. In particular, the failure to achieve a fully legitimated public female presence in American culture can be read in the transformations of the various dominant modes of containment of which the female complaint is both a model and a symptom.

2NR:

#### Extend Berlant 88. Berlant explains that the aff fails in two ways:

#### 1: opposition to patriarchal society is “effective,” i.e. not crushed the moment it’s articulated, only on the condition that it’s disregarded—it’s taken as just a complaint. This means the project of the killjoy is self-defeating. Outweighs on probability since it’s repeated throughout “American cultural history.”

#### 2: killjoys don’t reclaim calling-out sexism; rather, their responses to instances of patriarchal ideology are coded as call-outs by patriarchal contexts. Killing joy is too easily absorbed into the affective economy to be useful—outweighs since it speaks to systematic articulations of desire.

## Trans PIK

#### Their analysis of the feminist killjoy is transphobic – it affirms a universal experience of bodily truth and uses metaphors that assume an unvarnished comfort in one’s body that may be inaccessible to some folks. Understanding debate as a molded chair is not a useful metaphor if one’s body creates friction through its existence, rather than just its articulation in the social field of debate.

#### Affirm the AC except replace the feminist killjoy with the transfeminist kill/joy.

Cowan 14 [T. L. Cowan 2014 is the FemTechNet Chair of Experimental Pedagogies in the School of Media Studies and a lecturer in Culture and Media at Eugene Lang College at the New School. “Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance.” *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly* \* Volume 1, Number 4 \* November 2014]

This essay considers an affective trope that I have come to recognize as “the transfeminist kill/joy”: a set of proliferating dialectics expressed as the rage1 that comes into being through living the violent effects of transphobia and transmisogyny and the practice of transformational love as a struggle for existence.2 While the transfeminist kill/joy might certainly be understood as a politicized aesthetic and form of social action that extends well beyond (cis)gender feminist politics and social life,3 here I read for the poetics of killing trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist joy. In this discussion of recent transfeminist critical creative work, I trace how the transfeminist kill/joy works both to spoil feelings of political and social well-being or pleasure that are contingent upon the tacit absence or explicit exclusion of trans women in feminist conceptual and physical spaces and to restructure, claim, and repair feminist happiness through what Chela Sandoval (2000: 180) has called “a hermeneutics of love.” In my framing of the “transfeminist kill/joy,” I hope to signal, as does Sara Ahmed (2010) in her original framing of the feminist killjoy, that the mere presence or arrival of perceived difference can be understood as “threaten[ing] the social bond” (68) within privileged feminist scenarios.4 While Ahmed frames the killing of feminist joy (67) mostly in terms of women of color in white feminist spaces, and certainly racism and transphobia and trans-misogyny are not interchangeable,5 I suggest that trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist political and social scenarios can be understood to experience a similar threat to the “organic enjoyment and solidarity” (67) of the (perceived homogeneity of the) group when forced to deal with the presence or proximity of trans women, since this arrival “exposes not only the unreliableness of the body as a source of their identities and politics, but also the fallacy of women’s universal experiences and oppressions” (Koyama 2006: 704). Put in the terms of Ahmed’s earlier work (2006), the transfeminist kill/joy is an assemblage of affects that reorients feminist happiness toward rather than against trans women,6 and uses anger and love to resist a feminism designed exclusively for non-trans women, not necessarily feminism by all non-trans women.7

#### Add a couple links on case…

2NR AT PERM:

#### Centering DA: the priority of “trans” in the killjoy is both an epistemological and a material concern—it’s necessary to resolve crises within the figure of the killjoy and prevent the killjoy from harming trans women.

Cowan 14 [T. L. Cowan 2014 is the FemTechNet Chair of Experimental Pedagogies in the School of Media Studies and a lecturer in Culture and Media at Eugene Lang College at the New School. “Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance.” *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly* \* Volume 1, Number 4 \* November 2014]

Stryker has emphasized the importance of understanding transgender studies as knowledge production, and I want to make a connection here between Stryker’s vision and Audre Lorde’s (1984: 53) understanding of love, joy, and the erotic as knowledge production, as a “source of power and information within our lives,” and anger, which she figured similarly as “loaded with information and energy” (127).17 Stryker (2006: 8–9) writes, “Epistemological concerns lie at the heart of transgender critique, and motivate a great deal of the transgender struggle for social justice. Transgender phenomena, in short, point the way to a different understanding of how bodies mean, how representation works, and what counts as legitimate knowledge. These philosophical issues have material consequences for the quality of transgender lives.” The dialectical structure of transfeminist kill/joy scenarios that call out the ways in which we “partici- pate, knowingly or otherwise, in [our] sister’s oppression” (Lorde 1984: 128) and acknowledge anger, love, joy, and the erotic as transformative sources/sites of power and knowledge, creates the possibility for change and reminds us that we are not stuck in current conditions.18 Significantly, these transfeminist moments of joy are not examples of what Ahmed (2010: 84) would call the obscuring act of taking cover “by looking on the bright side . . . to avoid what might threaten the world as it is,” but rather, this is love as resistance tactic, performing the powerful material consequences of loving trans women.

#### Links are disads to the perm so here they come…

## Cap

#### The valorization of killing joy and affective analysis fails to create material change in structures of exploitation that oppress women. The feminist killjoy is complicit with global capitalism.

Cotter ‘2 [Jennifer Cotter, Assistant Professor of English at William Jewell College, “Feminism Now,” Red Critique, March/April 2002, http://redcritique.org/MarchApril02/feminismnow.htm]

In this paper I argue that for feminism to confront its own crisis, it must deal with its obsession with "post-" theories (from post-structuralism to post-Marxism) and instead produce transformative praxis that puts the focus on the needs of women for material equality and freedom from necessity. The retreat into culturalism—in which culture is determining of all social relations—is so deep in contemporary feminism that an argument such as the one I make is nowadays automatically dismissed as a late form of "economism". But a feminism not founded on material conditions, as the history of feminism in fact proves, is ineffective. In its most effective moments, feminism has worked to address this task by dialectically relating the questions of gender and sexuality to matters of labor, capital, and their relation ("exploitation"). Gender, sexuality, and the needs of women for material equality and freedom from necessity were never treated as simply personal or cultural issues—that is, as interpersonal relations or floating signs without any set meanings. Rather, they were understood as social relations and as such the effects of englobing historical conditions of production. Contemporary feminism, as I have already implied, has all but abandoned the question of mode of production—especially the relation of labor-capital and its impact on gender and sexuality—and has put in place of revolutionary praxis (as a means for ending economic inequality and restoring social justice), an "ethical resistance"—a new "transnational civil society". "Ethical resistance", to be clear, transforms the laws of motion of capital into sentimental codes of affect, caring, and civility and, therefore, advocates primarily for changes in behavior as a means for social transformation. In this context, contemporary feminism has placed primary emphasis on interpersonal, "emotional relations", and specifically "caring labor" and "emotional labor" as the root site of "resistance" and "agency" for women. In doing so, transnational feminism puts forward the understanding that the social relations of reproduction are not only autonomous from the relations of production but also the root social relations that need to be transformed in order to emancipate women. In doing so, transnational feminism restricts change for women to within the social relations of production based on exploitation. For instance, cultural theorists such as J.K. Gibson-Graham, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff argue that what is important in determining the material conditions of people's lives under capitalism is not whether or not they are exploited but the "affective [and emotional] intensity associated with exploitation"—that is, how they experience exploitation (Class and Its Others 14-15). Following this logic, feminists such as Harriet Fraad and Jenny Cameron argue that what is necessary for changing the conditions of women's lives is transforming the "emotional division of labor" and how women affectively and emotionally perceive their position in the mode of production and the social division of labor. As a consequence, contemporary feminists are advocating as solutions to material inequalities and conditions of economic necessity for women under capitalism, "new" models of civil, interpersonal, and emotional behavior such as Chela Sandoval's "postmodern love", Marjorie Mayo's "emotional democracy", and Rosemary Hennessy's "revolutionary love". What makes a critique of this turn to "civility" all the more urgent is that many contemporary feminists (such as Mayo and Hennessy) who advance "ethical resistance" do so under the pretext of presenting a "revolutionary", "socialist" or "anti-capitalist" solution to the material contradictions of women's lives in capitalism and, as a consequence, mislead women who are struggling for social transformation to reformist solutions. "Ethics" has, in fact, become the primary method by which contemporary feminism and cultural theory generally try to "distance" itself from the problems related to its reliance on "post-" theories (such as post-structuralism and its notion of "free play", which, it has increasingly become evident, serves as a defense of the "free market" and ruling class interests). As a result of the increasing pressure of economic inequalities in transnational capitalism and its consequences in deteriorating the conditions of women's lives, many feminists have had to embrace projects that "oppose" capitalism (on "ethical grounds") in order to remain "credible". Transnational feminism, to put it bluntly, is political opportunism with a progressive face. That is, it purports to address the needs of women globally—but the actual practices proposed by transnational feminists do little to change the material conditions of the vast majority of women's lives, and in fact reveal that the (affective/emotional) "needs" to which transnationalists attend are actually the very privileged concerns of those whose needs have already been met. This is because by reducing the transformation of material conditions of exploitation to changing behavioral norms and codes of civil conduct, feminism goes no further than offering a "caring capitalism" as "resistance" to material inequality and dire necessity for the majority of women around the globe. As I argue throughout the essay, far from working to address the material conditions of need for women in transnational capitalism, the "new models" of "transnational civil society", "civility" and "ethical citizenship" that transnational feminism offers are actually an updating of the traditional and illusory notion of "freedom" as "autonomy" from material conditions necessity that has long served to help maintain capitalist production and the exploitation of the majority's labor for the profit of the minority. In fact, transnational feminism is a particularly destructive path for feminism and has become a most effective ally of transnational capitalism, which is violently working to undermine and erode the material conditions available for collective social well being, economic security, and freedom from exploitation and economic necessity for all persons, in order to maintain profit. By putting forward the notion that social transformation for women is to be found primarily in behavioral changes and changes in interpersonal relations, transnational feminism abandons any notion of "material freedom" for women, which requires not merely "self-empowered" changes in personal conduct and how we emotionally and affectively perceive the material conditions in which we live, but change in the material conditions of production that subordinate the needs of the majority to profit for the few.

#### The feminist killjoy is a bourgeois subject—its exceptionality requires the subjugation of working-class women and its rejection of concrete planning in favor of organic collectivization allies itself with Capital. Historical materialist feminism is the only theory with the systematicity to solve.

Torrant 14 [Julie, "It Is Time To Give Up Liberal, Bourgeois Theories, Including New Materialist Feminism, And Take Up Historical Materialist Feminism For The 21st Century," The Red Critique, www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2014/historicalmaterialistfeminismforthe21stcentury.htm]

Grosz's "freedom to" or "within" which occults the conditions that necessitate freedom is a vacuous and empty concept of freedom that provides an apologetics for wage-slavery (and the growth of human trafficking) in capitalism. It puts in ideological suspension the historical and material conditions of necessity and exploitation which determine the ends and interests toward which "life" is put in capitalism by representing them as not only impossible but unnecessary to understand. In doing so, this theory is a most effective ally of capital because it rejects the possibility and necessity for collective social transformation, planning, and organization. Without transformation of production relations, the "innovation" and "creativity" of the exploited—the capacity of the worker to produce—is still subordinated to production for the profit of some not the needs of all. Rather than becoming the basis of freedom for all, workers surplus-labor enriches the owner's profit and conditions of life while workers are reduced to the sheer fact of biological living. Grosz merely translates this process of alienation through exploitation into metaphysical terms and celebrates it as freedom. Freedom is not an imaginary ontological autonomy but, as Engels argues, it is "a product of historical development" (Anti-Dühring 144). Women and others can be free only insofar as they are free from necessity. Freedom from necessity is founded not on ontological autonomy but on social collectivity, which is a material relation of production in which no one person can privately own the means of production and, therefore, command over the surplus-labor—and thus the lives—of others; "a state of society in which there are no longer class distinctions or anxiety over subsistence for the individual, and in which for the first time there can be talk of real... freedom" (145). Grosz is more concerned with the freedom of some from "definitions" rather than the freedom of all from exploitation. She writes: "Freedom has no given content; it cannot be defined" (147) and explains this theory with the following statement from Bergson: "Any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism" (quoted in Grosz 147). However, Grosz does not actually leave freedom without a content—and, specifically, a class content. She writes: "Freedom is thus the exception rather than the rule in the sense that it can function only through the ‘autonomy' of the living being against a background of routinized or habituated activity" (148). In other words, freedom is a matter of the "exceptional" living being who acts in unconventional ways. Yet, this "freedom" requires the continuation of "a background of routinized or habituated activity" that the so called "exception" can be offset against. For the majority of women this means the normalization of their routine and habitual exploitation by capital which Grosz dehistoricizes by abstracting it from the material relations of production that enable it. Put another way, Grosz's theory ideologically normalizes and "disappears" the material exploitation of women's surplus-labor in transnational capitalism by ideologically "dissolving" it into a question of their "habituated activity." Grosz's "exceptionalism" puts into sharp relief the class interests behind her argument for a feminism that is "unconcerned with the other and its constraints" and that rejects "a shared existence with the other" (141). This is not a theory of the autonomy of the feminist subject from the "(oppressive or dominant) other" (139, emphasis added) as Grosz claims. Rather, it is a theory for a ruling class feminism which is aimed at dispensing with the collective needs of the exploited others in capitalism for freedom from necessity through collective social transformation. This is the mark of a turn to a capitalist class theory because capitalists benefit when we concern ourselves only with ourselves. When we do this (focus on the individual), we make ourselves as well as others easier targets for exploitation. Despite its disclaimers, new materialism ideologically updates liberal feminism, and this not only leads it to reject conceptuality as the erasure of the random, the unpredictable, and the indeterminate, but to affirm the bourgeois theory of individual liberty, which underwrites new materialism's notions of affirmative ethics and autonomous freedom. Liberty, as Marx argues in "On the Jewish Question," is "[t]he right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into himself" (Reader 42). Individual liberty takes for granted a world in which individuals are divided by class: on the one hand there is the class of workers who are forced to compete with one another on the market for "jobs" in order to gain a livelihood and survive. On the other, there are the capitalists who buy the labor of workers on the market and profit from the use of that labor in production. What Marx calls the individual withdrawn into himself is thus the cultural effect of economic relations that make possible the individual who puts her own private need above collective need, and who thus accepts a world in which the have-nots struggle as individuals, increasingly alienated, in order to make ends meet. This is of course the individual whose liberty to remain an unregulated individual—to put the private before the collective—is lauded by the bourgeois, who take this right as a transhistorical, indeed natural phenomenon. As Marx puts it, the "practical application of the right of liberty is the right of private property" (42). Through the lens of individual liberty, capitalists' deepening of the rate of exploitation of workers may be criticized for being "too high" at times, when the class divide threatens to destabilize capitalism, but the ability of capitalists to exploit their workers is never questioned. Hence the emphasis, not on the need for transformation, but on the "selfless" and "noble" accommodation to worsening exploitation—a mantra that is everywhere repeated whenever working class movements demand better wages or working conditions. A "materialism" that does not account for the historical relation of "life" in general or the conditions of women's lives in particular to the ensemble of the social relations of production—that is to class relations and exploitation in production—is not materialism but a new spiritualism that ideologically covers over the social structures and historical basis of inequality and economic contradictions in capitalism, and presents these as existential conditions of life as such. What Alexandra Kollontai said of feminists of the 20th century is still true today of new materialist feminists, including Grosz and Braidotti. She writes: However apparently radical the demands of the [bourgeois] feminists, one must not lose sight of the fact that [they] cannot, on account of their class position, fight for that fundamental transformation of the contemporary economic and social structure of society without which the liberation of women cannot be complete. (176). It is time to give up liberal, bourgeois theories, including new materialist feminism and take up historical materialist feminism for the 21st century.

## Essentialism

Probably not as useful since I doubt they link.

#### Specifically, their understanding of femininity as pure negativity, the absolutely otherized in masculine discourse, is a monopoly that reproduces masculine violence—otherization functions plurally, making use of a broad range of folks.

Butler 04 [Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley, 2004 Judith, “Bodies That Matter,” Engaging with Irigaray, Ed. Burke, Schor, Whitford, pp. 160-162 // WWXR]

So perhaps here is the return of essentialism, in the notion of a "feminine in language"? And yet, she continues by suggesting that miming is that very operation of the feminine in language. To mime means to participate in precisely that which is mimed, and if the language mime is the language of phallogocentrism, then this is only a specifically feminine language to the extent that the feminine is radically implicated in the very terms of a phallogocentrism it seeks to rework. The quotation continues, "[to play with mimesis means] 'to unveil' the fact that, if women are such good mimics, it is because they are not simply resorbed in this function. They also remain elsewhere, another case of the persistence of 'matter'..." They mime phallogocentrism, but they also expose what is covered over by the mimetic self-replication of that discourse. For Irigaray, what is broken with and covered over is the linguistic operation of metonymy, a closeness and proximity which appears to be the linguistic residue of the initial proximity of mother and infant. It is this metonymic excess in every mime, indeed, in every metaphorical substitution, that is understood to disrupt the seamless repetition of the phallogocentric norm. To claim, though, as Irigaray does, that the logic of identity is potentially disruptible by the insurgence of metonymy, and then to identify this metonymy with the repressed and insurgent feminine is to consolidate the place of the feminine in and as the irruptive chora, that which cannot be figured, but which is necessary for any figuration. That is, of course, to figure that chora nevertheless, and in such a way that the feminine is "always" the outside, and the outside is "always" the feminine. This is a move that at once positions the feminine as the unthematizable, the non- figurable, but which, in identifying the feminine with that position, thematizes and figures, and so makes use of the phallogocentric exercise to produce this identity which "is" the non-identical. There are good reasons, however, to reject the notion that the feminine monopolizes the sphere of the excluded here. Indeed, to enforce such a monopoly redoubles the effect of foreclosure performed by the phallogo- centric discourse itself, one which "mimes" its founding violence in a way that works against the explicit claim to have found a linguistic site in metonymy that works as disruption. After all, Plato's scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of women, slaves, children, and animals, where slaves are characterized as those who do not speak his lan- guage, and who, in not speaking his language, are considered diminished in their capacity for reason. This xenophobic exclusion operates through the production of racialized Others, and those whose "natures" are considered less rational by virtue of their appointed task in the process of laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life. This domain of the less than rational human bounds the figure of human reason, producing that "man" as one who is without a childhood; is not a primate and so is relieved of the necessity of eating, defecating, living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always a property holder; one whose language remains originary and untranslatable. This is a figure of disembodiment, but one which is nevertheless a figure of a body, a bodying forth of a masculinized rationality, the figure of a male body which is not a body, a figure in crisis, a figure that enacts a crisis it cannot fully control. This figuration of mas- culine reason as disembodied body is one whose imaginary morphology is crafted through the exclusion of other possible bodies. This is a material- ization of reason which operates through the dematerialization of other bodies, for the feminine, strictly speaking, has no morphe, no morphology, no contour, for it is that which contributes to the contouring of things, but is itself undifferentiated, without boundary. The body that is reason dematerializes the bodies that may not properly stand for reason or its replicas, and yet this is a figure in crisis, for this body of reason is itself the phantasmatic dematerialization of masculinity, one which requires that women and slaves, children and animals be the body, perform the bodily functions, that it will not perform.44 Irigaray does not always help matters here, for she fails to follow through the metonymic link between women and these other Others, ide- alizing and appropriating the "elsewhere" as the feminine. But what is the "elsewhere" of Irigaray's "elsewhere"? If the feminine is not the only or primary kind of being that is excluded from the economy of masculinist reason, what and who is excluded in the course of Irigaray's analysis? The above analysis has considered not the materiality of sex, but the sex of materiality. In other words, it has traced materiality as the site at which a certain drama of sexual difference plays itself out. The point of such an exposition is not only to warn against an easy return to the materiality of the body or the materiality of sex, but to show that to invoke matter is to invoke a sedimented history of sexual hierarchy and sexual erasures which should surely be an object of feminist inquiry, but which would be quite problematic as a ground of feminist theory. To return to matter requires that we return to matter as a sign which in its redoublings and contradictions enacts an inchoate drama of sexual difference.

## Rage Bad

#### Defining the alternative as rage fragments movements, eschews change, and cements opposition.

Bixler 10 [Melina, MA University of London, Sociology, Goldsmith College, The University of London, "The Use of Anger in Constructing Inclusive Feminist Movements"]

Defining a group by its anger can imply that all women experience and are motivated by the same anger. Anger can become a mechanism whereby group solidarity is desired yet never fully attainable as long as the anger is seen as a collective, as opposed to an individual, experience (Ahmed 2004a). This essentialist approach to mediate solidarity through an apparent shared emotion can be counterproductive to building an inclusive feminist movement. On the other hand, expressions of anger shared among the group that are seen as individual stories and experiences can form connections. Sharing our story in a way that acknowledges each story as different is the only way in which the story can truly form connections between subjects. This cultivates sameness through difference and solidarity from the diversity of the collective. “Feminist theory and consciousness-raising groups [allow] women to make connections between their experiences and feelings in order to examine how such feelings were implicated in structural relations of power.” (Ahmed 2001, p.172). Expressing anger against a system of injustice may in some ways unite a movement, but knowing what to do with that anger can be tricky. “It is on the ‘now what?’ stage that the fate of anger depends” (Tavris 1982, p.248). I am angry about the continued popularity of the sex trafficking of girls and young women. I am angry about rape laws that protect predators. I am angry about persistent pay inequalities. I am angry about welfare-to-work programs that rob single mothers of time with their children. I am angry, now what? It becomes too easy to sit in a feeling of anger that prevents any movement forward. If a movement becomes defined or unified by anger we can miss the opportunity to do something productive. We need to move out of anger into action. “Once [anger] has drawn attention to the grievance, it does not do much to change anything. Change, over the long haul, requires organisation, patience, good humor, and the ability to negotiate and compromise; all of which may be energised by anger or killed by it.” (Tavris 1982, p.253) Just as anger can fester within immobility, so can it become ambivalent—either ablaze with fury or dormant with suppression. On the one hand, we pathologise anger, conduct countless social research projects and provide therapeutic services that dedicate their work to helping subjects “deal” with their anger. Anger becomes something to get rid of; an unfavourable emotion. At the same time, the expression of anger is encouraged and concealing or containing one's anger is viewed as unhealthy, consequently leading to social or psychological problems (Tavris 1982). Tavris identifies two American icons that embody this ambivalence. Both champion the fight against evil, yet experience anger in extreme opposition. Clark Kent rarely expresses anger, and his frustrations with injustice appear as mere irritations. He simply emerges as his alter ego, Superman, rushes off to defend what is right and conquers evil. David Banner, on the other hand, experiences an anger that transforms him into a vehement beast, the Hulk, with uncontrollable wrath. "These incarnations of anger represent dual attitudes: *is* anger handsome or ugly, righteous or dangerous? Is it under our control, or do we have as much chance of telling it what to do as of regulating the carotid artery? Is it a human blessing, or a bestial sin?" (Ibid., p.29) It is an age old story that women's anger is misunderstood and/or disregarded. It is viewed as irrational, hysterical or even crazy. The focus is not on exploring the object of a woman's anger but instead on calming her down and either dissolving or overpowering the expression as quickly as possible. Just as women experience men's unwillingness to validate or appreciate their anger about sexism, women of colour also experience white women's failure to see the value in their anger about racism. As observed by Marilyn Frye (1983), judging anger as extreme or unfounded both minimises the feeling of the expresser and stifles any learning that can come from the expression. However frustrating this failure to understand anger may be, it is still a barrier for women to overcome if anger is going to be a useful political tool in feminist movements.

#### Turns case, feminist killjoys get silenced in reason-based activities. Outweighs on probability—LD fetishizes rational argumentation.

Park ’14 [Shelley M., Professor of philosophy @ U of Central Florida, The “Feminist Killjoy” in the Room: The Costs of Caring about Diversity, Florida Philosophical Review Volume XIV, Issue 1, Winter 2014]

This prevalent reaction to the feminist philosopher is captured by Sara Ahmed’s description of the “feminist killjoy”—a configuration of the female troublemaker who kills the joy of others by failing to find “the objects that promise happiness [to them] to be quite so promising.” The word feminism, she suggests, is thus “saturated with unhappiness:” Feminists, by declaring themselves as feminists, are already read as destroying something that is thought of by others not only as being good but as the cause of happiness. The feminist killjoy “spoils” the happiness of others; she is a spoilsport because she refuses to convene, to assemble, or to meet up over happiness. In myriad ways, the feminist philosopher “spoils” the happiness of her colleagues by questioning the alleged universal appeal of philosophy as it is practiced by a select group of people in a particular part of the world. To raise questions about the retention and recruitment of female and minority students in department meetings marks one as “difficult;” to fail to see the humor in a colleague’s sexist or racist joke marks one as “humorless;” to question the lack of attention to race, class, gender, nation, disability, and so forth in textbooks and at conferences marks one as “disagreeable.” The feminist philosopher is a killjoy. Note how the trope of the feminist killjoy undermines the feminist philosopher’s ability to be heard on issues of diversity. In each of the examples listed—as well as in our anonymous male philosopher’s blog post, the feminist philosopher’s critical reflections on the harassment, exclusion or marginalization of women and minorities is deflected by changing the subject from philosophy’s lack of diversity to the feminist philosopher’s lack of happiness: “situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as about the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy about .” We have seen this play out on the national stage in recent years. Consider, for example, Brian Leiter’s 2011 skewering of Linda Martín Alcoff for her attempts to address the diversity problem in philosophy. For her role in developing “The Pluralist’s Guide to Philosophy” —a guide for prospective female and minority graduate students seeking departments with climates hospitable to them and their potentially “non-traditional” interests—Alcoff was subjected to public ridicule, character attacks and calls for her resignation as Vice President of the American Philosophical Association. Ironically (but not perhaps incidentally), the very attacks that brutalized the APA’s first Latina President elect, served to silence her concerns about philosophy’s diversity problem. In Leiter’s hands, the target of anger and subject of needed change shifted from the discriminatory exclusions of philosophy to the discriminatory exclusions of the Pluralist Guide. A similar rhetorical strategy has framed the discussion around the reports of sexual harassment in philosophy departments on various campuses. The findings of the APA’s 2013 site visit to determine the climate for women in Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder—that the department maintained “an environment with unacceptable sexual harassment, inappropriate sexualized unprofessional behavior and divisive uncivil behavior” —were quickly eclipsed by criticisms of the site team itself. The rapid shift in attention from the hostile climate for women in philosophy to the alleged feminist ideological biases (and thus tainted findings and recommendations) of the site team illustrates how quickly “the exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence.” Like Alcoff, the members of the UC Boulder site team—Valeria Hardcastle, Peggy DesAutels, and Carla Fehr—were subjected to character attacks for being alleged feminist ideologues whose biases harmed members of the philosophical profession, specific departments of philosophy, and the discipline of philosophy itself. In both cases, a series of ad feminism attacks functioned to silence feminist philosophers’ accounts of philosophy’s institutional harms to women at the same time as they perpetuated new harms. As Marilyn Frye suggested over three decades ago, “it is a tiresome truth of women’s experience that our anger is generally not well received;” it generally fails to get uptake. This is especially true, perhaps, of the anger of the feminist philosopher. Insofar as philosophy values impartial reason, the anger of the feminist philosopher at the harassment, marginalization, and exclusion of women and minorities in philosophy marks her as someone incapable of being dispassionate and reasonable. Moreover, her desire to do something about the under-representation of (and suffering of) women and minorities in the field marks the feminist philosopher as having “a political agenda.” In other words, the feminist philosopher is marked from the start as something other than a philosopher. In a remarkable feat of circular reasoning, the feminist philosopher is discounted as a philosopher by virtue of the fact that she cares about philosophy’s diversity problem. Thus, what she has to say about philosophy’s diversity problem can be discounted because of her lack of philosophical credentials.

#### Love is key to addressing domination. It creates visions of life that are in fact affirming and not requirements of happiness. Merely calling out oppression is insufficient—one must create one’s own joy outside of institutional closure.

hooks 2k [bell hooks, All About Love: New Visions, 2000]

Domination cannot exist in any social situation where a love ethic prevails. Jung’s insight, that if the will to power is paramount love will be lacking, is important to remember. When love is present the desire to dominate and exercise power cannot rule the day. All the great social movements for freedom and justice in our society have promoted a love ethic. Concern for the collective good of our nation, city, or neighbor rooted in the values of love make us all seek to nurture and protect that good. If all public policy was created in the spirit of love, we would not have to worry about unemployment, homelessness, schools failing to teach children, or addiction. Were a love ethic informing all public policy in cities and towns, individuals would come together and map out programs that affect the good of everyone. Melody Chavis’s wonderful book Altars in the Street: A Neighborhood Fights to Survive tells a story of real people coming together across differences of race and class to improve their living environment. She speaks from the perspective of a white woman who moves with her family into a predominately black community. As someone who embraces a love ethic, Melody joins her neighbors to create peace and love in their environment. Their work succeeds bus undermined by the failure of support from public policy and city government. Concurrently, she also works to help prisoners on death row. Loving community in all its diversity, Melody states: “Sometimes I think that I’ve been trying, on death row and in my neighborhood, to gain some control over the violence in my life. As a child I was completely helpless in the face of violence.” Her book shows the changes a love ethic can make even in the most troubled community. It also documents the tragic consequences to human life when terror and violence become the accepted norm. When small communities organize their lives around a love ethic, every aspect of daily life can be affirming for everyone. In all his prose work Kentucky poet Wendell Berry writes eloquently about the positive values that exist in rural communities that embrace an ethic of communalism and the sharing of resources. In Another Turn of the Crank, Berry exposes the extent to which the interests of big business lead to the destruction of rural communities, remind us that destruction is fast becoming the norm in all types of communities. He encourages us to learn from the lives of folks who live in communities governed by a spirit of love and communalism. Sharing some of the values held by citizens of these communities he writes: “They are people who take and hold a generous and neighborly view of self-preservation; they do not believe that they [we] can survive and flourish by the rule of dog eat dog; they do not believe that they can succeed by defeating or destroying or selling or using up everything but them[our]selves. They doubt that good solutions can be produced by violence. They want to preserve the precious things of nature of human culture and pass them on to their children. . . . They see that no commonwealth or community of interest can be defined by greed. . . . They know that work ought to be necessary; it ought to be good; it ought to be satisfying and dignifying to the people who do it; and genuinely useful and pleasing to the people for whom it is done.

#### Rage = whiteness

Moawadjune 15. Sarah Moawadjune, co-editor of Muftah’s Egypt & North Africa pages. Born in the United States, raised in Saudi Arabia, but with her heart and roots in Egypt, Sarah is a “Third Culture Kid,” simultaneously out of place and at home everywhere and nowhere. She holds a BA in Political Science and Global Studies from the University of Pittsburgh, and recently completed a Master’s in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University, "In America, Rage Is a White Privilege", Muftah, 6-25-2015, < http://muftah.org/america-race-white-privilege/#.Vh7uxBNViko >

This week, Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev had a hearing in a federal courtroom, where he was officially sentenced to death and given an opportunity to make a statement to the court. The event comes on the heels of last week’s tragedy in Charleston, and has some people wondering how we value and deploy “forgiveness” in this country. The tweet by Saladin Ahmed, author of the award-winning fantasy novel “Throne of the Crescent Moon,” touched upon an idea explored in a handful of recent articles. In a piece titled “Black America should stop forgiving white racists,” Stacey Patton writes in the Washington Post: Forgiveness has become a requirement for those enduring the realities of black death in America. Black families are expected to grieve as a public spectacle, to offer comfort, redemption, and a pathway to a new day. The parents of Trayvon Martin, Jordan Davis, Mike Brown and the widow of Eric Garner were all asked in interviews if they’d forgive the white men who killed their loved one. …the almost reflexive demand of forgiveness, especially for those dealing with death by racism, is about protecting whiteness, and America as a whole. This is yet another burden for black America. After 9/11, there was no talk about forgiving al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden. America declared war, sought blood and revenge, and rushed protective measures into place to prevent future attacks. As the Atlantic Monthly, writer Ta-Nehisi Coates noted on Twitter: “Can’t remember any campaign to ‘love’ and ‘forgive’ in the wake of ISIS beheadings.” No one expects Jewish people to forgive the Nazis or contemporary anti-Semitic acts. But black people are held to an impossibly higher standard. This rush to forgive — before grieving, healing, processing or even waiting for the legal or judicial systems to process these crimes — and the expectations of black empathy for those who do great harm is deeply problematic. I heard about Tsarnaev’s statement on the radio. In the twenty-one-year-old’s first public statement in the two years since the bombing and subsequent car chase that resulted in four deaths, he apologized to the victims and survivors for “the lives I have taken, for the suffering that I have caused you, for the damage I have done – irreparable damage.” The radio coverage about his statement was quickly followed by reactions from some of the victims, one of whom expressed anger at what she believed was a disingenuous, insincere apology: “He just threw in an apology to the victims, but he kept talking about Allah, and hoping that Allah will have mercy on him.” Her rage was palpable, as was that of twenty-four other individuals who delivered “victim impact statements” following Tsarnaev’s death sentence: “While your intention was to destroy America, what you have really accomplished is actually quite the opposite — you’ve unified us. We are Boston strong, we are America strong, and choosing to mess with us was a terrible idea. So how’s that for your VICTIM impact statement?” – Rebekah Gregory, lost a leg in the bombing “He is a leech abusing the privilege of American freedom, and he spit in the face of the American dream.” – Jennifer Rogers, sister of slain MIT officer Sean Collier “He can’t possibly have had a soul to do such a horrible thing.” – Karen Rand McWatters, best friend of Krystle Campbell (one of the three people killed) and also lost her own leg in the bombing Of course, it is only natural for the pain of victims, survivors, and their loved ones to run deep, and for the response to these sorts of incidents to be driven by rage, anger, and a desire for revenge. Yet the rhetoric being used to discuss the Charleston and Boston cases, both of which claimed the lives of innocent victims, is decidedly different. As Daily Show host Jon Stewart explained following the Charleston shooting in a poignant monologue on his June 18, 2015 show, “what blows my mind is the disparity of response between when we think people that are foreign are going to kill us, and us killing ourselves.” If this had been what we thought was Islamic terrorism, it would fit into our — we invaded two countries and spent trillions of dollars and thousands of American lives and now fly unmanned death machines over five or six different countries, all to keep Americans safe. We got to do whatever we can. We’ll torture people. We gotta do whatever we can to keep Americans safe. Nine people shot in a church. What about that? “Hey, what are you gonna do? Crazy is as crazy is, right?” That’s the part that I cannot, for the life of me, wrap my head around, and you know it. You know that it’s going to go down the same path. “This is a terrible tragedy.” They’re already using the nuanced language of lack of effort for this. This is a terrorist attack. This is a violent attack on the Emanuel Church in South Carolina, which is a symbol for the black community. It has stood in that part of Charleston for 100 and some years and has been attacked viciously many times, as many black churches have. Why is there such a stark difference in the way we speak about these tragedies? Is it because the Boston Marathon bombing was such a public and horrific spectacle, injuring over 200 and leaving devastating carnage in its wake? Is it because twenty-one-year-old Dylann Roof, the Emanuel Church shooter, is a white American, while Dhzokar Tsarnaev, as some victim testimonies emphasized, was an immigrant from Russia, who enjoyed the benefits of living in the United States, “abused the privilege of American freedom,” and then attacked American citizens? Is it because black rage, as Stacey Patton writes, is “challenged as inappropriate and unhelpful,” whereas white rage is expected, excused, and understood? Rage, in this country, is not something everyone is entitled to feel. If you are always worried about being the Angry Arab, the Angry Muslim, the Angry Black Woman, the Angry Indian or Pakistani or Latino, then you understand this well. Minority groups constantly have to evaluate how their rage reflects poorly on their race, their ethnicity, their religious group or affiliation, while white people are given the space to grieve and scream and feel anger and exercise their humanity, as individuals, without fear their actions will be viewed as representative of their entire race. When the parents of Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown are made to mourn publicly and asked to forgive their children’s killers, but Kim Goldman can write a book entitled “Can’t Forgive” about her refusal to forgive O.J. Simpson for the murder of her brother Ron, it becomes difficult to deny the double standards and racial implications of how tragedy is dealt with and responded to in this country. The uncomfortable, but increasingly blatant, reality seems to point in one direction: rage is a white privilege.